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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JULIE WHITE, 
-vs-
Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, DON 
CHRISTIANSEN, ADMINISTRATOR, 
UTAH STATE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 
AND HEALTH DIVISION OF THE UTAH 
STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
CASE NO. 15340 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Respondent State of Utah is responding to an appeal 
from a Memorandum Decision and Order of the Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen, Judge of the First Judicial District Court 
of Cache County, dismissing Appellant's cause of action. 
.. 
II 
i 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Upon Motion by Respondents, the District Court below 
dismissed the cause of action filed by Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek to have the Order of Dismissal 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in Appellant's brief 
sets forth a number of allegations based on the Complaint 
(R-1) and because this is an appeal to review an Order dismis; 
the Case, there have been no responsive pleadings or discover: 
proceedings, and Respondents therefore have no basis to 
agree or disagree with those allegations, except as to ilie 
course of this action. 
A Notice of Claim was filed with the Attorney General 
in June of 1976, upon which no action was taken. Suit was 
then brought in the First District Court, County of Cache, 
against Respondents to seek relief for injuries alleged~ 
suffered by the Appellant. There were no responsive pleading 
filed to Appellant's Complaint (R-1). Respondents' .Motion 
-2-
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b 
to Dismiss (R-10) was filed with the lower Court and a 
i·!emorandurn of Points and Authorities (R-12) and a Supplemental 
;.lemorandum of Points and Authorities (R-18) in support 
thereof were filed with the Court. Appellant filed an 
opposing Memorandum (R-21). 
Based on these memorandums, the Court below dismissed 
the action. See: Memorandum Decision (R-26). The lower 
Court held that Appellant's cause of action arose out of the 
exercise and discharge of a governmental function, and thus 
was barred by governmental immunity, since the State had not 
waived sovereign immunity for failure to conduct an inspection 
or for an inadequate inspection or for an inadequate or 
negligent inspection (R-26, 28). The lower Court held 
further that Section 35-9-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, did not provide a remedy to the Appellant to sue 
the State for relief and that the State or its agencies 
could not be held liable for Appellant's injuries (R-27, 28). 
Appellant now appeals the Order of lower Court dismissing 
her cause of action. 
-3-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE ACTION 
BY FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT COULD NOT MAIN-
TAIN AN ACTION UNDER SECTION 35-9-13, UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED 
The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 was 
passed to supplement and create a new division of the State 
Industrial Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health 
Division (hereinafter "OSHD"). Title 35, Chapter 9, Utah c0;, 
Annotated 1953, as amended. (All references hereinafter shall 
be to the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, unless other· 
wise noted.) The OSHD is empowered through an administrator 
to administer the law to ensure that every employee in the 
State has a workplace free of hazards. Section 35-9-4(1) (a). 
In order to accomplish that purpose, the Commission is to 
establish standards, rules and regulations to be followed by 
employers, Section 35-9-4, and the OSHD is charged with the 
enforcement of the standards, rules and regulations so 
established. Section 35-9-10. 
Section 35-9-13 details the procedure which the Adminisi·i 
of OSHD may follow if he is aware of an i=inent danger in' 
place of employment which, by following the normal procedure 
of OSHD, could not be eliminated before such danger could 
-4-
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reasonably be expected to cause death or physical harm 
when the employer will not voluntarily remove the hazard. 
As outlined in the statute, the Administrator may petition 
my District Court to restrain any conditions or practices 
which meet the above mentioned criteria. Section 35-9-13 (a), (b) . 
The Appellant seeks to hold the Respondents liable 
under subsection (d) of Section 35-9-13 which states in 
pertinent part: 
"(d) If the administrator arbitrarily 
or capriciously fails to seek relief under 
this section, any employee who may be 
injured by reason of such failure . . . 
may bring an action against the administrator 
. . . for a writ of mandamus and for further 
appropriate relief." 
The Appellant has relied on this subsection out of 
context and contends that the State has waived its immunity 
from suit by permitting the action against the Administrator 
and that, therefore, the Appellant may maintain a cause of 
action for damages against the Respondents. It is clear 
that subsection (d) must be read in light of the language 
of the preceding subsections, and that an action may be 
brought against the Administrator only if he arbitrarily or 
capriciously fails to petition the Court. A prerequisite to 
such judicial relief is that the Administrator must be 
aware of the dangerous conditions, which condition is discoverable 
only through inspections made by OSHD representatives pursuant 
to Section 35-9-8. After discovering the hazardous condition, 
-5-
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if the Administrator fails to obtain appropriate relief, 
then and only then may the employee bring an action agairs 
the Administrator. 
To capriciously or arbitrarily fail to petitL.m the 
Court to restrain a hazardous condition, implies a knowledg, 
of such condition. 
The record does not show that any inspections were made 
by OSHD, or that any complaints were filed with the OSHD by 
Del Monte employees. In Appellant's Brief (at page 2) and 
her Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R-21, 22) she 
alludes to inspections that were made in 1971 and 1972. 
Those inspections, however, were made prior to promulgation 
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which was passed 
in 1973, and therefore, before creation of the OSHD. There 
are no allegations in her Complaint of any inspections of 
her employment by the OSHD, nor is there any continuity 
between the authority given the Industrial Commission under 
Section 35-1-16 and the establishment of the OSHD by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973. Appellant may 
not, therefore, maintain her action under Section 35-9-13(d) 
as the facts of her case do not meet the requirements of 
said Section in that: (a) the Administrator had not disCO\'e'.' 
an inuninent danger as there were no inspections made of her 
place of employment, thus (b) he did not arbitrarily or 
capriciously fail to seek a court injunction as he had no 
cause to do so. 
-6-
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for the Court to hold that the Appellant has a cause of 
action under Section 39-9-13 is to hold that all who suffer 
injuries as the result of a dangerous condition while in the 
course of their employment have a cause of action for damages 
against the Administrator and the Indus trial Corrnniss ion, 
regardless of whether or not the Administrator was aware of 
the dangerous condition. In Olson v. State Industrial Commission, 
538 P.2d 1038 (1975) the Court was concerned with a similar 
question which is dispositive of this issue. In that case, 
the Plaintiff was suing the State of Utah for failure to 
prevent an accident which had occured in the course of 
Plaintiff's employment. The Court, referring to Section 35-1-16(1) 
(111hich states that the Industrial Commission has the duty to 
"enforce all laws for the protection of life, health, and 
safety and welfare of employees"), said that the State 
incurred no liability by not preventing the accident. 
Justice Henroid writing for a unanimous Court said: 
"The citation of statutes and cases 
pointing up certain safety standards the 
State must meet, [Referring to Utah 
Industrial Commission regulations and 
Section 35-1-16) simply do not require 
the State to have done other than it did 
to meet the exigencies of the facts here, 
or to employ untold thousands to police 
~conceivable project whatever." 
[Emphasis added. J 
Id at 1040. 
-7-
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As Appellant states in her brief at page 5 the f 
' acts 
of Olsen are not identical to the present case, but the 
Policy considerations are identical -- whether the statutes 
mandate that the State is to police every place of 1 emp oyme~ 
for potential hazards and thereafter incur liability when a 
hazard is not eradicated and someone is injured. The Court 
in Olsen held that the State did not incur any such liabili:. 
Respondents respectfully submit that the facts of the 
case as plead by the Appellant do not support a cause of 
action under Section 35-9-13 as the requirements of the 
section have not been met. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SUPPORT A CAUSE 
OF ACTION AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS AS SUCH A 
CLAIM IS BARRED BY GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
As provided in Section 63-30-3, all governmental entiti, 
shall be immune from suit for any injury which arises out o: 
the activities of said entities in the discharge of a goverc• 
function. A governmental entity is defined to include the 
state and its political subdivisions, which definition 
encompasses the Respondents. Section 60-30-2 (1), (3) · sove:' 
immunity is to be preserved through strict application of 
this Section and such is waived only when clearly expresse: 
Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 511 P.2d 1286 (1'17JI 
-8-
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The doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, applies 
only to the discharge of "governmental functions", and not 
to proprietary activities. Greenhalgh v. Payson, 530 P .2d 
79 9 (1975). In applying the factors set forth in Greenhalgh 
to determine whether an activity is governmental or proprietary 
(See: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, R-14), it is clear that 
Appellant's activities fall within the governmental function 
and would not, therefore, be subject to any claim by Appellant. 
Immunity from suit, however, has been waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of a 
government employee committed within the scope of his employment 
unless the act or omission is a specifically enumerated 
exception to the waiver. Section 63-30-10. Two of those 
exceptions are directly applicable to the present case. The 
statute and applicable exceptions state: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an 
employee committed within the scope of his 
employment except if the injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused, or ... 
(4) arises out of a failure to make an 
~nspection, or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of any 
property." 
Section 60-30-10. 
-9-
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The first exception states that immunity is not Wai'·,. 
for those functions which are discretionary. Appellant 
deals with this exception indirectly in her brief. s~ 
claims relief under Section 35-9-13 by stating that the 
Administrator failed to seek relief as mandated by the 
statute and that he, therefore, was not performing a 
discretionary function. Appellant claims that because thi 
statute requires the Administrator to petition the Court fo: 
a Restraining Order, his acts are at the "operational leve: 
of government and, therefore, do not fall within the excep'.. 
of Section 63-30-10 (1). The judicial relief of Section J\.:1 
is not available to an employee unless an inspection is ma(, 
under Section 35-9-8 by the Administrator or his represen'.1:. 
The natural reading of Section 35-9-13 demands that the 
Administrator have an accurate knowledge of the hazardous 
condition before he can "arbitrarily and capriciously" fail 
to seek a Court injunction. 
The OSHD Administrator can only obtain knowledge of 
such hazardous conditions through inspections of a workpla~, 
by himself or his representatives. Section 35-9-8. Such' 
function, the conducting of inspections, is clearly a 
discretionary function of the Administrator, for even upor. 
receipt of a complaint by an employee of the existence ofa 
hazard, the Administrator is to conduct such an investigac 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only upon reasonable grounds to believe that a violation or 
danger exists. Sections 35-9-4, 35-9-8. Respondents submit 
that Section 63-30-10(1) bars Appellant's claim, as the 
conduct of an investigation is discretionary with the Administrator. 
In addition, Section 63-30-10(4) provides the second 
applicable exception to the waiver of immunity. It states 
that the governmental entity has not wfJJJved its immunity if 
the action arises out of a failure to perform an inspection 
or to perform such inadequately or negligently. Under the 
facts of the present case, Appellant seeks to hold the State 
liable for an inspection that was never conducted and an 
obvious reading of Section 63-30-10(4) bars any recovery for 
such a claim. The entire thrust of Appellant's argument 
under Point II of her brief is based upon the OSHD Administrator's 
alleged awareness of the alleged hazardous condition of the 
Del Monte plant, but Appellant has failed to show or allege 
in the pleadings that any inspections of the plant were ever 
carried out by the OSHD Administrator or his representatives. 
Section 63-30-10 (4) bars any claim for injury for failure to 
make an inspection and, therefore, is a barrier to any 
recovery against the Respondents. 
-11-
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
ACTION AS APPELLANT HAS NOT PRESENTED 
AN APPROPRIATE CLAIM OF RELIEF AS INTENDED 
BY THE LEGISLATURE UNDER SECTION 35-9-13. 
Appellant is seeking relief for alleged damages using 
as authority for her claim, Section 35-9-13(d) which proviJ, 
that an employee may bring an action against the Administr;: 
"for a writ of mandamus and for further appropriate relief" 
Appellant relies on the phrase "for further appropriate 
relief" to support her claim for damages against the State. 
The issue presented by Appellant's claim is whether the 
phrase "for further appropriate relief" will support a clai: 
for money damages against the State to compensate for an 
alleged injury suffered while in the course of her employn:e'.: 
Under the generally accepted statutory construction 
doctrine of "ejusdem generis", a generally descriptive word 
or phrase which follows a specifically designated class of 
persons or things is to be interpreted as meaning the me 
general nature or class of persons or things it is precedec 
by. The rule is stated as follows: 
"Under the rule of construction known 
as "ejusdem generis", where general words 
follow the enumeration of particular clas~es 
of persons or things, the general words will 
be construed as applicable only to persons 
or things of the same general nature or class~ 
as those enumerated. The rule is bcised on the 
-12- d 
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obvious reason that if the legislature had 
intended the general words to be used in their 
unrestricted senses they would have made no 
mention of the particular classes." 
82 ~rpus Juris Secundum "Statutes", Section 332(b), p. 658. 
Though the doctrine of ejusdem generis is most often 
applied to phrases which normally have more than one specific 
item enumerated and then followed by the general term, it is 
certainly applicable in this case to aid the Court in determining 
the full force of the term "further appropriate relief". A 
general term preceded by a specific term is restricted by 
that specific term. See: Hatch Company v. Public Service 
Commission, 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P. 2d 809 (1954): Townsend v. 
Board of Review of Industrial Corrrrnission, 493 P. 2d 614 
(1972). 
The main import of Section 35-9-13 is to give the 
courts jurisdiction to issue restraining orders upon petition 
of the Administrator to restrain any hazardous condition 
which the employer fails to remove voluntarily. Subsection (d) 
of that section permits an employee to bring an action 
against the Administrator for a writ of mandamus compelling 
the Administrator to petition the Court for such a restraining 
order· The subsection also permits the employee to seek 
other forms of relief if appropriate for the particular 
circumstances of the case. Interpreting the statute in view 
of the ejusclerr1 gener-is doctrine, it is clear that the "further 
-13-
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appropriate relief" is to be relief consistent in form ''litf. 
the writ of mandamus. It is equally clear, however, that : 
suit for damages against the Administrator is quite a 
different form of relief than the writ of mandamus and does 
not fit generally with the interpretation and general meani: 
of Section 35-9-13. If the legislature had intended to 
permit suits for damages against the Administrator for his 
arbitrary or capricious failure to petition the Court, they 
would have expressly provided for such in the statute. 
Another a/tJument which supports the view that an acti0 
for damages may be brought against the administrator only if 
expressly provided for is found in Holt v. Utah State Road 
Conunission, 51l P. 2d 1286 (1973). In interpreting the 
Governmental Immunity Act, specifically Section 63-30-3, 
the Court stated that the doctrine of sovereign irrununity is 
to be preserved, and will be deemed waived only when express: 
provided for in the statute. To find that a suit for damage' 
may be maintained against the administrator under Section 
35-9-11, is to broaden the waiver of governmental immunity 
and controvert the policy and intent of the legislature in 
passing the Governmental Inununity Act and past decisions of 
this Court regarding sovereign immunity. 
Respondents respectfully submit that Appellant has noc 
sought for appropriate relief under Section 35-9-13. The 
doctrine of ejusdem generis and the policy of preservin~ 
-14-
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governmental immunity do not permit such a loose interpretation 
of subsection (d) of that statute so as to permit an action 
for damages against the State. It is clear from the face of 
ilie statute, that the legislature did not intend for such a 
result, nor do the accepted principles of construction allow 
such a result. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's cause of action was properly dismissed by 
the Court below in that Section 35-9-13 supports no claim 
for relief against the Administrator and is further clearly 
barred under the terms of the Governmental In:nnunity Act. 
For the reasons stated above, Respondents pray that the 
Order of Dismissal of the First Judicial District Court of 
Cache County be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
HARRY E. McCOY II 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
-15-
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